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4-420 (Text)

Item metadata
Speaker:
addressee author,male,Lyne, William John,53
ns1:discourse_type
Oratory
Word Count :
6199
Plaint Text :
ns1:register
Speech Based
ns1:texttype
Minutes
ns1:localityName
http://dbpedia.org/resource/South_Australia
Created:
1897
Identifier
4-420
Source
Federation Debates Adelaide, March 28
pages
174-90
Document metadata
Extent:
33989
Identifier
4-420-plain.txt
Title
4-420#Text
Type
Text

4-420-plain.txt — 33 KB

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Mr. LYNE:
I should not have attempted to take up the time of this Convention, but as I had not the privilege of being one of the Convention in 1891, I deem it my duty to place on record on the present occasion my ideas in the same manner as other gentlemen in this assemblage have done. I take it that the resolutions which have been tabled and which are before the Convention at the present time are intended to elicit from its members their ideas as to what should be embodied in the proposed draft Bill, and if that is not so I think those resolutions would absolutely fail in their object, and though with the expectation of repeating many of the arguments, dealing as I must of necessity with subjects that have already been discussed by other gentlemen, I am bound to take the course indicated. I remember-it is now a long time since-when one of the first Conventions was held, I think in Melbourne, one of its members, and a leading member-Mr. James Service-said that the lion in  the path, as far as the Federation of the colonies was concerned, was the fiscal question. It seems to me that has altogether died a natural death as between the colonies.
Mr. HIGGINS:
Hear, hear.
Mr. LYNE:
If I take the speeches which have gone before, I find that the lions in the path at the present time are more than one, but the principal is that of State rights. I take it that is to be the trouble in connection with this Convention, and next to that the cession of the railways to the Federal Government, and last, perhaps not least-as I think has been shown by the gentleman who has just resumed his seat-the question of pooling or amalgamating the debts and assets of the various colonies. These three things seem to me to point to the troubles before us in this Convention, and I shall attempt as shortly as possible to deal with those matters seriatim. I recognise that the speech just delivered by Mr. Holder is one that has raised many difficulties-difficulties which will be found hard to overcome. But though agreeing with him in some respects, I must be allowed to altogether disagree with him in many others; I think the majority of this Convention will disagree with him in many of the statements he has made. First of all, he raised the question Mr. HOLDER:
Hear, hear. Certainly.
Mr. LYNE:
I come next to the question of States and State rights. Unfortunately I had not the privilege and pleasure yesterday of listening to some of the able speeches delivered, but I took the opportunity of glancing through them as reported, and I find that the smaller States proposing to enter this Convention have a very great deal to say about State rights. It was an ingenious argument used by Mr. Holder, when he said that the smaller States, especially in the matter of the franchise, had more to consider as against the larger States, than bad the larger States against the smaller. I reverse the picture absolutely, and assert that the larger States have more to consider in connection with the franchise of the smaller States than was put in the proposition of Mr. Holder. It seems to me that what some of the smaller States representatives want is not only to govern their small States as they are doing now, but also to have a very much larger finger in the pie of governing the larger States than they are entitled to. I take it that in this particular the larger States must have the predominant power in the Federation. And if you refer to the history of the creation of the Senate of the United States of America, you will find, I think, that it was not first created as the portion of the Parliamentary machinery which it afterwards became.
Mr. TAYLOR:
Hear, hear.
Mr. LYNE:
I find that when the originators of the Senate decided to elect that body they were in this position, that they had very little, scarcely anything, to guide them in the formation of their Constitution-a very different position to  that we are in to-day-they are groping to a large extent without any guide; and when the Senate was created, as it was subsequently created, it was mainly as a check upon the great power of the President.
Mr. ISAACS:
Hear, hear.
Mr. LYNE:
I find that no one in the Convention of 1787 set out with the idea of such a Senate as ultimately emerged from their deliberations. Although it had technically been created as a branch of the Legislature, it was thought of as being first a body with executive functions only. And this, at first, it was. Now that being so, if we create a body such as we propose at present, we do not take the idea embedded in the minds of the members of the Convention of 1787 as to what the powers of the Senate should be. It is no use talking round this question and shirking the duty which devolves upon us, because it would be only wasting time, and for that reason I wish to say that I have always, as long as I have given the matter a thought, been against equal representation in the Senate; and I shall adhere to that unless convincing argument on the other side is used.
Sir PHILIP FYSH:
We might as well go, then.
Mr. LYNE:
I should not like Sir Philip Fysh to pack up his portmanteau.
Mr. REID:
He has to stop and finish this contract somehow. (Laughter )
Mr. LYNE:
We had better approach this question in a straightforward manner, and say at once what we are prepared to do, and what ideas we have upon the subject. In referring to the powers of the Senate as they exist at the present time in America, what are those powers supposed to be? They are not equal with those of the House of Representatives. They are described by Bryce in a manner with which I entirely concur. The powers of the Senate I take it should be to:
Correct the democratic recklessness of the House of Representatives and the monarchical ambition of the President.
An HON. MEMBER:
Hear, hear.
Mr. LYNE:
Another idea of the power of the Senate:
To restrain the impetuosity and fickleness of the popular House, and so guard against the effects of gusto of passion or sudden changes of opinion in the people.
An HON. MEMBER:
Hear, hear.
Mr. LYNE:
It is also given as another reason that:
The propensity of a single and numerous assembly to yield to the impulse of sudden and violent passion is restrained.
I say the Senate, in the first place, should not be constituted on equal representation. What right has Tasmania to have as strong a power in the administration of New South Wales as New South Wales.
Sir PHILIP FYSH:
What right has Rhode Island to have equal power with Sydney?
Mr. LYNE:
I do not agree with that, either. I do not agree with Tasmania having equal power with New South Wales, and I question whether it is wise for Tasmania to enter the Federation at all. A few hours ago I was reading a letter appearing in one of the morning papers in which I saw it stated, with a good deal of force, that the first thing Tasmania should do would be to join Victoria and go in with Victoria as part of the Federation. That may be wise for Tasmania to do.
An HON. MEMBER:
And overpower New South Wales.
Mr. LYNE:
You cannot overpower New South Wales. I do not think it is a wise thing to adhere to equal representation in the Senate, provided you are to give the Senate reasonably strong power. If you are to make the Senate a nonentity no harm can be done in giving equal representation, but you must do one of two things. You must either give proportionate representation in the Senate, or refuse power to the Senate to stop the will of the people. One or the other must be done, because where would be the use of having a House of Representatives to  spend time in preparing and passing legislation when the smaller Chamber had more power, would use it, and could absolutely block any legislation which the House of Representatives sent up? I have heard an argument used by many that there should be one Chamber only, but I do not agree with that argument either. I am favorable to having two Chambers, and the second Chamber should only have the power stated in the above quotations, that is, not to stop legislation, but simply to stay it; and if, after a clear demonstration and expression from the people, certain legislation is required, then the Senate shall be called upon to give way. I read with some degree of pleasure the speech delivered by Sir George Turner, wherein he said he was favorable to the referendum in case, between the Senate and House of Representatives, a deadlock arose. I concur in this expression, but not to the extent he did. I think we can devise means by which a crisis may be prevented from having the ill effects a crisis usually has. The method I refer to is what is known as the Norwegian system. My friends of the smaller States will say, "If you do that you will overpower the smaller States":
but that can be avoided. The way it is applied in the country to which the system belongs is that, when the two Houses are sitting together, a measure must be carried by a two-thirds majority; the possibility of a crisis is then alleviated at any rate, if not absolutely prevented, and the States reasonably protected. Only in important cases that could be laid down with clearness could I agree, so far as I am personally concerned, to the intervention of the referendum. I do not think, after the experience we have had at the late elections, the referendum will be so popular as it has been in the past. I look upon it as one of the most conservative measures that can be introduced.
Mr. REID:
Hear, hear.
Mr. LYNE:
It has been thought by those of the other way of thinking that it was a liberal measure. I think that, so far as the late elections are concerned, those who call themselves the Liberal Party in the various colonies have been almost wiped out.
Mr. BARTON:
That was no referendum.
Mr. LYNE:
I am speaking of those who call themselves democrats, of the Labor Party, a party which in New South Wales thought it could dominate any election of the whole people, but which has not been able to return a single member of its way of thinking. I say the time has arrived when the referendum will not be so popular as it has been in the past. At the same time I recognise it is a way of getting at the feelings and opinions of the people, and that is what I understood the Premier of Victoria so strongly desired when he advocated a resort to the referendum. I take it, for instance, that in such a case as the alteration of the Constitution, and other such seriously important matters, the referendum could be brought into play, not, however, till every system that is now used, or may be imported into this Bill, had been used, to prevent the loss and annoyance of a crisis. That being the view I take of it, I think the smaller States need not be alarmed that they are to be injured by my proposal to leave the great power in the hands of the people. I read the statement made by Mr. Carruthers, that what was desired was unification, in the same way as it exists in the British Constitution. I do not think, however, these colonies desire unification at the present time; they desire, I think, a system of Federation that will be fair to all parties, and they do not desire any system that will be unreasonable, and under which some of the larger colonies are going to lose a great deal. I say, and I emphasize it, that of all the colonies which will lose, if loss it may be called, for the first few years, it is the mother-colony of New South Wales, which will lose more than all the other colonies put together.
 Mr. PEACOCK:
How?
Mr. DEAKIN:
Gain more.
Mr. LYNE:
I must be permitted to think that she will lose more, though Mr. Deakin may think otherwise.
Mr. WISE:
There is one thing-she can afford it much better.
Mr. LYNE:
That may be. If Queensland comes into the Federation, and I hope she will be represented here, she may say that with her large territory she can afford it much better than New South Wales; but I say New South Wales is going to lose more than all the other colonies put together. I dare say members of the Convention have read the interesting pamphlet published by Mr. Nash on the financial position, which, I think, clearly demonstrates what New South Wales's loss would be. He says further-
If New South Wales is coming into the Federation, she will have to be prepared to give a very great deal. And the question is whether she is going to get anything in return.
Mr. HOWE:
She will.
Mr. LYNE:
Probably she will by-and-bye. I know Mr. Barton will say that she is to have all the industries form the other colonies concentrated in Sydney, because she has her coalfields.
Mr. BARTON:
Not necessarily Sydney.
Mr. LYNE:
That may be by-and-bye. It is a matter we have to look forward to,
Mr. DOUGLAS:
Hear, hear.
Mr. LYNE:
I think she will be called upon to give up more than Mr. Douglas thinks. She is the wealthiest colony in the group, and has perhaps other advantages, which will commend themselves to gentlemen present, but I think we are here to conserve to some extent the interests of the States we represent as well as deal with questions in reference to the other States. As to the question of the franchise, one gentleman said, Why not have one House and one House only? I think there should be a difference between the franchise of the Senate and the House of Representatives, and what that difference should be, not as Mr. Barton suggested, that the whole of each colony might elect its senators as one electorate; because I think if that is done it will be found only those who are men of means, and who can command wealth, will be able to get into the Senate.
Mr. BARTON:
The election just held was the cheapest ever held. I never spent less.
Mr. Lyne:
That was in consequence of the representative character of the honorable gentleman.
Mr. Barton:
No.
Mr. deakin:
It will be cheaper in large constituencies.
Mr. lyne:
I may turn to an example to the contrary. I think they had something of the kind in south Australia a few years ago, and representatives to the Upper House were elected by the colony as one electorate. I believe exactly what I state is likely to occur took place here, or why did this colony alter her system from on electorate to several?
Mr. Higgins:
Not because of the expense.
Mr. Lyne:
I am told that it was because of the expense, and because only wealthy men could contest the elections.
Mr. Barton:
That was in the Conservative days of this colony.
Mr. Lyne:
If it was in the Conservative days of this colony why does she not return to it?
Mr. Gordon:
Population had too much power in the Upper House.
 Mr. LYNE:
Do you not desire that population should have power?
Mr. GORDON:
A fair power.
Mr. LYNE:
I think they should have all the power.
Mr. BARTON:
They mean that the city would have too much power as compared with the country.
Mr. LYNE:
Certainly. If you take the colonies of New South Wales and Victoria you will find the larger proportion of the population in and around Sydney and Melbourne, and these two will dominate the remainder of the colony.
Mr. PEACOCK:
That was not our experience at these elections.
Mr. LYNE:
This election is entirely different to the elections which will take place for the Senate; and I am stating now my opinion only, and I give to you what has been experienced, demonstrated as it has been in this colony by practical result, which should go a great deal further than any theory you can advance to prove what is likely to take place. I would like to see the senators elected from as many districts as the number of senators each colony has to return.
Mr. BARTON:
It would not then represent the State as a whole.
Mr. LYNE:
I think it would. My opinion is that there should be a difference between the House of Representatives and the Senate, and this difference, that the voting age should be raised so that instead of any elector of the age of 21 being allowed to exercise the franchise, he should be 25 or 30 before he is privileged to vote for senators. That would make a great deal of difference, and still carry out the principle of one man one vote. Now, as far as the franchise is concerned, I hope that this Convention will agree to it being equal for all the colonies, not only for the House of Representatives but also for the Senate; and in view of the remarks of Mr. Holder-I agree with some of them in this particular-I cannot see how it is possible the first election is to take place other than upon the present franchise-a franchise which was described by the Premier of Tasmania as "a sufficiently liberal one." I do not know what he thinks is "a sufficiently liberal franchise." Where there is a £40 property qualification I do not consider a liberal franchise exists. You may depend upon it the qualification over all these colonies under Federation will he universal suffrage. And I would go further-
Sir PHILIP FYSH:
Everyone can earn £40.
Mr. LYNE:
A great many at the present time cannot. I also think we ought to provide in this Bill what the franchise in the future, after the first election, should be for the Senate as well as the House of Representatives; and I would like to say, in answer to the remarks made by Mr. Holder, that, as far as I am personally concerned, I would like to see it further extended, as you have extended it in South Australia, to women. That question ought to come up during this Convention. It is beside the question to imagine that, if we are to have uniform federation, we can have representatives from various States elected upon a different basis. We should enter upon all these questions at the present time, and deal with them as they come before us. There is no use trying-
Mr. DOUGLAS:
What became of the lady who contested the election in South Australia?
Mr. LYNE:
I suppose she had not the requisite qualification, or she would have been elected. That is beside the question. It is reasonable to expect the franchise to be even throughout the whole of the colonies. If it is not so, trouble will arise from the very start. We must frame a Constitution from which there shall be no secession, and one that will prove a binding contract between all the colonies, or else the same troubles which arose in the United States, when  States desired to withdraw from the Federation, will arise here. We must also have a Constitution that can largely be built upon in the future by custom. The Constitution of Great Britain is not upon any hard and fast lines, but expanded by custom and usage. We must, therefore, have a Constitution sufficiently elastic to be built upon, and made stronger and more suitable in the future than we can possibly expect to make it at present. That being so, we are called upon to exercise the greatest discretion and the greatest consideration. It is singular, perhaps, that we are carrying on this question almost at the same stage in our history as it was conducted in the United States of America. We are about 100 years old. So were the States of America a century old when they be-an to think upon their union in the same way as we are. It would not be out of place at the present time to point out that on that particular occasion, when the Union was being considered, the representation that was given to the Senate was this:
Originally Congress fixed the ratio of members to population, and the House accordingly grew; but latterly, fearing a too rapid increase, it has fixed the number of members with no regard for any precise ratio of members to population. At present the total number is 329, being, according to the census of 1880, one member to 154,325 souls.
The original number was one member to every 30,000, but afterwards that was increased to 50,000. If the franchise is extended to women, I propose we should have one member to every 100,000; but if we do not extend that to women, then we should have one member to 50,000 only.
Sir GEORGE TURNER:
It is not a question of the number of voters, but the population.
Mr. LYNE:
I thought I made myself clear on that point.
Sir GEORGE TURNER:
You are thinking it is one to so many electors. It will make the same number of votes.
Mr. LYNE:
The Premier of Victoria is right if it applies to the total population. I was only applying it to the number of electors. I will take it on the basis of population, one member to 50,000, which would return near eighty members as the House of Representatives; that would not make the House or the Senate, with an average of six members from each State at the beginning of our Federal Parliament, too large. If there is one thing more than another that the Australasian Colonies are afraid of it is that we will have a large House, too extravagant and too expensive in its character. The desire is to reduce that House to as small a number as would be compatible with the work it has to do. If, as has been suggested by Mr. Holder, it is not to have the control of the Posts and Telegraphs or the Customs, will there be need for a large House? Now, it seems to me, if we did not band over either of these to the Federal Parliament, we might just have a few gentlemen sitting together as a Federal Council.
Mr. BARTON:
It is a question whether you would even want a Senate or a House of Representatives.
Mr. LYNE:
If Mr. Holder's ideas were carried out you would hardly want either. I think he would hand over the question of defence, the question of quarantine, and the question of a Federal Supreme Court.
Mr. HOLDER:
And the framing of a new Customs and Excise Act.
Mr. LYNE:
Framing one, but not collecting the duties. They would not have much to do after the first framing had taken place. All the work then would be handed over to the various States to do it for the Federal Government. We do not want much in the shape of a Federal Parliament, if that is all they are to do. But I desire to speak of a Federal Parliament which will have work far in excess of that referred to by Mr. Holder. I still want to see a Parliament not too large in numbers, with a Senate certainly not more than half the size of the House of Representatives. If  we have for the former equal representation in the various colonies as suggested-some six from each colony-there will be about thirty or thirty-six, say at the outside forty-two, members. There would then be about eighty in Representatives. That is a fairly large House, and yet not large. But if we went further, and allowed the number of members to increase according to the increase of population, we do not know to what extent that might go. We had a little experience of this in New South Wales a few years ago, when an amending Bill was brought in allowing an increase in the number of members according to the population of the various electorates. As a result our House was brought up from about ninety members-before we knew where we were-to a House of one hundred and forty-one. Of course we had to reduce this number, and get back nearer to the stage where we were before. In any Bill we may frame at the present time we must fix the maximum number.
Mr. O'CONNOR:
Make the House of Representatives bear a certain proportion to the numbers of the Senate.
Mr. PEACOCK:
Hear, hear.
Mr. LYNE:
The Senate should bear the proportion to the House of Representatives as one-half. That is a fair thing to do.
Mr. PEACOCK:
You mean the other way about.
Mr. LYNE:
No; I do not. I want a Senate about one-half the size in number of the House of Representatives, and the House of Representatives to be elected upon a certain basis to be described in the Draft Bill, neither House to be increased, but a maximum to be fixed by an amendment of the electoral basis for the House of Representatives. At the present time we have in New South Wales a limited number of representatives; but there is no limit as to altering the districts. There is, however, a limit to the number of representatives who can be returned, and by that means only is it possible to restrict the number of members that will be returned for the House of Representatives. Also, by doing that, you restrict the number of members to the Senate. My idea of the proportionate representation in the Senate is to allow the smaller States a minimum number of representatives, but not to equal that of the more populous ones. The proportion would be in comparison to the number given to the larger States. I had thought of a minimum of four to the smaller States, and that they should remain at that minimum until their population arrived at the stage when they would be entitled to an increase.
Mr. WALKER:
How many?
Mr. LYNE:
They would have a maximum of eight. At the present time the colony of Victoria would be entitled to seven or eight, New South Wales to seven or eight-I think to eight-and the other colonies of Tasmania, South Australia, and Western Australia would be entitled-two of them to four, and the third, perhaps, to five, the last-named being South Australia.
Mr. DOUGLAS:
Very good!
Mr. LYNE:
It is all very well for the smaller States to say "very good" in that sarcastic way. They cannot have everything their own way. (Laughter, and hear, hear.) If any of the States have a right to have their own way, it is the larger States. I hear what Mr. Douglas has said; but what would happen if Victoria and New South Wales, for instance, decided to federate? The smaller States would have to come in. (Laughter.)
Mr. DOUGLAS:
They are free and independent.
Mr. LYNE:
It is all very well to say free and independent; but they would be compelled to come in if Victoria, New South Wales, and, say Queensland, federated.
Mr. BARTON:
Is that the spirit in which we are to consider it?
Mr. LYNE:
No; I am not saying that that is the spirit in which we should consider  it, but I am saying, in answer to interjections, that such things could take place. I am not saying that they are going to take place, because I am prepared to give consideration to the full to the claims of the smaller States.
Mr. DOUGLAS:
Very little.
Mr. LYNE:
If a very little, a very just one. These gentlemen may have to thank us for less than I suggest before the thing is done. But that is by the way. I do not mean to say that the arguments used by the various speakers will not affect my ideas beyond those I have formed at present. If we did not come here to consider the views put before us we had better not have come at all.
Mr. HOWE:
You are well pronounced, at all events.
Mr. LYNE:
For this reason I give expression now to my ideas, because they are individual opinions, and let them be combated by others. Equal State rights would be extremely unjust to the larger colonies of the group. There is another thing. If we are to have equal representation I would curb the power of the Senate. I would not allow it to amend Money Bills or reject Money Bills.
Mr. DOUGLAS:
Hear, hear.
Mr. LYNE:
I am very glad to have the concurrence of Mr. Douglas, because that would help to do away with the objection to equal State rights. Of course they have always the power of rejecting any measure sent up from the House of Representatives, but Mr. Wise said he would give the power to amend Customs Bills. It is not a power given to some of the Legislatures at the present time, and, as it is in some respects a tax on the people, the Senate should not have the power of amending line by line a Customs Bill. That would take away their power to a very large extent. I turn now from the construction and the powers of the Senate to another question, which is one of those, I take it, likely to be fought very hard in this Convention, and that is the question of handing over the various railway systems throughout the colonies. My opinion is that they should not be given over, and I do not think it will meet with the concurrence of the States, at the present time at any rate, to hand over these railways to a federal control. I find the total cost of the railways throughout the colonies amounts to £94,834,000, and that they are yielding, taking the average, 2.97 per cent. It was stated by some of the representatives yesterday that it would cost £4,000,000 to equalise the gauge. Why, it will cost nearer £20,000,000; and I will show how. Of course, I am speaking approximately. We have invested nearly £100,000,000 in the railways; we have the 4ft. 8 1/2in. gauge in New South Wales, the 5ft. 3in. in Victoria, the 5ft. 3in. and 3ft. 6in. in South Australia, 3ft. 6in. in West Australia; of course, Tasmania is out of the question. Queensland, if she comes in, has the 3ft. 6in. gauge, and will anyone who understands anything at all about railway Construction tell me, if you are going to increase this gauge increase cuttings and tunnels to convert a 3ft. 6in. into a 4ft. 8 1/2in. gauge, it will cost only four millions or even ten millions?
An HON. MEMBER:
Are the tunnels not large enough?
Mr. LYNE:
I know in New South Wales they are not for a double line.
Mr. HOLDER:
You have the 4ft. 8 1/2in. gauge there now.
Mr. LYNE:
In some of the colonies they are not. There are several things to consider. You have to equalise the grade, in a great many instances to duplicate the gauge, and to alter the curves. In Queensland, the gauge is 3ft. 6in.; the cuttings and tunnels there are not large enough for a 4ft. 8 1/2in. gauge. Nor are they in some parts of South Australia.
Mr. O'CONNOR:
Broadening the gauge and altering the curves.
 Mr. LYNE:
There are tunnels and lines up and through mountains in various places, with sharp curves, and those who know anything about railway construction will not tell me they will not have to alter the curves. If it is to cost only £4,000,000 it should be done at once without hesitation, but I say in my opinion it will cost three or four times as much as has been suggested to do the work. One reason why I object to the amalgamation, or handing over of railways, is because I think they are a subject for State rather than federal control. It will be more in the interests of the State Governments to extend the State railways than it would be of the Federal Government to do so. I am not speaking of Victoria or South Australia, because they have extended their railways more than we have in New South Wales, where we are only on the fringe of extension to properly develop the country. We have only 2,600 miles of railway, when we should have 10,000 or 12,000 miles, and these works would be better carried out by the State than the Federal Government. There is one other thing that comes to my mind: 
the resolutions infer there is to be no differential rate, or, as I may more properly term it, preferential rate over the railways of any of the colonies and also the waterways. Now, I should like to ask the framer of that resolution, Mr. Barton, how he is going to prevent a differential rate over the waterways of the different colonies when the steamers are held by private companies? Is it possible to prevent a differential rate? Take New South Wales, which has differential railway rates to Bourke, to compete with the water carriage from Bourke to South Australia. By this amalgamation of the railways, and by doing away with the differential rates, you prevent the Government of New South Wales obtaining any of the produce from Bourke as it does now. By federating you tie her arms behind her back, and you allow the owners of the steamers, by fixing low rates, to carry the wool and the wheat down the river to Victoria and South Australia.
Mr. FRASER:  
To Morgan.
Mr. LYNE:  
I say to South Australia and Victoria; I do not particularise any spot. It seems to me to be an almost impossible thing to deal satisfactorily with this differential rating question. Mr. O'Connor very trenchantly put before the Convention the possibilities of dealing with the differential rates in the same way in which they are dealt with in the United States. If you are to do away with these differential rates, I think that is the only thing that can be done. By the appointment of an inter-State commission, giving it certain powers, it would be a simple matter to deal with the question, and would avoid the necessity which might otherwise exist, of handing over the railways to the Federal Parliament. These are questions which will be taken up in Committee, and the details gone into. There are, however, other aspects of this question. I have spoken of differential rates by private companies by land, and have left out the rates between colony and colony by sea. This might act just in the same way. If the railways are run from Sydney to Brisbane, from Sydney to Melbourne, from Melbourne to Adelaide, and perhaps from Adelaide to Perth, differential water-carriage rates might absolutely ruin the whole traffic of the railways under the Federal Government. How is that to be overcome? These are questions which I cannot answer at present. If we are to do away with the differential rating system, and to abolish the intercolonial tariffs, how are we to have the essence of Federation while a railway barrier exists between the colonies? This is one of the first things to consider. How are we to deal with the differential rates between the colonies, and not have the protective system under it while free waterways exist, which allows of a differential rating system? There is another  question which was brought to my mind by the remarks of Mr. Holder-the question of State rights. How these small States would deal with us, and almost wring our necks if they had the opportunity! Take the question put by Mr. Holder as to the waters of the Darling. Are we in New South Wales to be prevented from dealing with the waters of the Darling, including flood waters, because the smaller States think they want these waters? The waters are in New South Wales, and we are not going to give up the right of utilising them on behalf of the producers of our colony.

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